Findings and Concerns

JPD’S Crisis Intervention Practices Are Still Not Adequate to Prevent Unlawful Uses of Force Against People With Behavioral Health Disabilities

We find that JPD’s crisis intervention policies and practices are not adequate and this inadequacy contributes to the use of excessive force against people with behavioral health disabilities.^[1]

Research shows that, nationally, between 7% and 30% of calls for police service are behavioral health-related.^[2] JPD conservatively estimates that at least 9% of its roughly 80,000 annual calls for service involve an individual with a behavioral health disability.^[3] The Joliet Police Department has begun moving to implement a Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model for responding to incidents involving people who have behavioral health disabilities. 

Recently, JPD has shown support for a co-responder model for incidents involving people with behavioral health disabilities.  JPD has begun to partner with Will County and mental health providers with the goal of developing alternative responses that would link police services with other community resources, and that may even eventually take police out of the picture entirely where a law enforcement response is not needed.

Reforms like these are essential: an unnecessary or ineffective police response to a behavioral health crisis may result in repeated calls, is more dangerous for both officers and the person who needs help, and can also be difficult and traumatic for officers.^[4] Some calls for service may be more effectively and safely resolved by dispatching non-sworn behavioral health professionals instead of (or in addition to) the police.^[5] Implementing an effective, cross-agency system to handle encounters that require a law enforcement response—and to provide a non-law enforcement response to calls that do not—helps achieve better outcomes for those who need services and allows police to focus their limited resources elsewhere.

Creating such a system is not entirely within JPD’s control, because a truly effective system for providing services to people with behavioral health disabilities requires more than the police. Nonetheless, JPD is making efforts toward the kind of cooperation among agencies that is needed and we commend JPD for moving in this direction.

Still, we cannot overlook the fact that JPD’s failure to implement a more effective Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) system within the Department has led to the use of disproportionate force against people in behavioral health crises. Under a CIT model, police departments provide a specialized police response to individuals with behavioral health disabilities, review these encounters to identify needs and improve practices, and coordinate with community service providers to reduce repeat police encounters caused by unmet behavioral or mental health needs.^[6] This can be an effective model for responding to incidents that require a law enforcement response to protect public safety. JPD has provided specialized CIT training to a substantial fraction of its officers, but it is not effectively deploying these trained officers to address behavioral health crises. As a result, people in crisis have been subjected to unlawful uses of force.

To assess JPD’s response to incidents involving people with behavioral health disabilities, our team analyzed JPD policies, trainings, and other materials related to its crisis intervention response, including those of the 911 Communications Center, which is operated and staffed by JPD.^[7] Our team also observed officers’ interactions with individuals in crisis, trainings on related policies and interactions, and 911 call-takers’ responses to calls potentially involving an individual with a behavioral health disability. We also interviewed JPD officers, Communications Center staff, and community organizations regarding the Department’s response to people with behavioral health disabilities. Finally, we reviewed a sample of incidents in which JPD officers used force against individuals who appeared to have a behavioral health disability.

Bridge mural in Joliet

Legal Standards

As described in Use of Force, the Fourth Amendment requires officers' force to be objectively reasonable in light of the “totality of the circumstances.”^[8] An officer’s awareness of an individual’s behavioral health disability is a factor in this analysis.^[9]

JPD’s responses to people with behavioral health problems may also be subject to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)^[10] and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA).^[11] Both laws prohibit public entities from discriminating against people with disabilities by excluding their participation in, or denying them the benefits of, their services, programs, or activities. Equality under these laws requires, for example, “that people with behavioral health disabilities receive a health response in circumstances where others would receive a health response.”^[12] Where access is not equal, public entities that administer emergency response systems—like JPD—must make reasonable modifications to their policies and programs to prevent discrimination. Reasonable modifications might include sending mental health professionals where a law enforcement response is not necessary (for example if the person is not accused of a violent or serious crime and does not pose a threat to public safety); dispatching a co-responder team made up of law enforcement and mental health professionals; or, when a law enforcement response is needed, sending officers who are skilled in crisis intervention techniques.

The Illinois Community Emergency Services and Support Act (CESSA), which took effect in 2022, now prohibits police from responding to a call seeking assistance with a mental or behavioral health crisis where mobile mental health providers are available unless the individual has committed a crime or presents a threat of physical injury to themselves or others.^[13] Mobile mental health providers may not yet always be available to respond to calls in Joliet. When they are not, JPD is still responsible for ensuring that its officers provide lawful, effective, and respectful service to community members.

We make no finding as to whether JPD violates the ADA, CESSA, or the IHRA in its response to behavioral health crises, but our recommendations are framed by these federal and state requirements. As JPD improves its crisis intervention system to address Fourth Amendment violations, JPD must also ensure that its solutions also comply with these anti-discrimination laws.^[14]

Findings

Our review of instances in which JPD officers used force included instances in which officers used unlawful force against someone with a behavioral health disability. Research shows that interactions between officers and individuals with a behavioral health disability are more likely to result in serious uses of force and death than are police interactions with the general population.^[15] This is partly because a person in crisis may have trouble processing and complying with shouted commands. These actions increase the trauma associated with a police response to a behavioral health crisis.^[16] This makes JPD’s approach,^[17] in which officers resort quickly to aggression and demand immediate compliance under threat of force, especially inappropriate, harmful, and likely to lead to excessive force when directed at a person who has a behavioral health disability. The continuing inadequacies of JPD’s crisis response systems further exacerbate the problem.

A telling illustration of the problem comes from a series of three interactions over a two-week period in 2020 with a man who has bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. All three interactions, each by different JPD officers, involved unlawful force.

In the first incident, officers responded to a call about a man standing in a daze at a gas station. When officers arrived, the man was crossing a street and was nearly hit by traffic. An officer approached the man, who moved onto the sidewalk and attempted to walk away. According to officer reports, the man tripped and fell to the grass. Officers ordered him to stay on the ground. When he attempted to stand up, officers tried to forcibly detain him. The man “tensed his whole body” and placed his arms under his chest to avoid being handcuffed. Officers used a baton to pry his arm out, punched him in the face, and then tased him in the back three times.

The extent of force used was excessive. The man was suspected, at most, of a very minor crime. Indeed, officers arrested the man only for resisting and obstructing a police officer, without an associated underlying crime, other than a citation for improperly walking on a roadway. The man did not assault the officers or otherwise pose a threat, and his behavior indicated he had a behavioral health disability. Under these circumstances, it was unreasonable to tase him three times and punch him in the face—both serious uses of force. Upon arrival at the station, the man was catatonic and had soiled himself, and an ambulance was called. JPD later learned that the man had been reported missing from a mental health clinic in Chicago, that he had schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and that he was experiencing homelessness.

Nine days later, JPD encountered the man again, in response to a retail theft of about $4 of food. A JPD officer found the man sitting barefoot behind a dumpster, eating a can of food, talking to himself, and staring into space. When the man did not respond to questioning, the officer told him that he was going to detain him and tried to grab the man’s wrist. According to the officer’s report, the man swung his arm toward the officer “in a flailing manner” and attempted to flee. The officer ordered the man to put his hands behind his back, but the man did not comply.

According to the officer’s report, the officer tased the man because his “behavior was erratic and he seemed mentally unstable.” The report then claimed that the officer tased the man a second time because the man would not put his hand behind his back and was trying to get up. But the taser video shows that the man was on his back, unmoving, arms wide, screaming in pain when the officer tased him a second time, within five seconds of the first taser cycle. The officer then yelled at the man that he needed to get on his stomach, or he would “get hit again.” When the man did not respond, the officer tased him for the third time in less than thirty seconds. This force was again excessive. It was unreasonable for the officer to repeatedly tase a man who was laying on the ground motionless, was suspected of only a minor, non-violent crime, and whom the officer recognized was experiencing a behavioral health crisis. The discrepancy between the officer’s justification for force and the video raises additional concerns with JPD’s use of force, supervision, and accountability systems documented elsewhere in this report. See Sections Use of Force and Accountability.

Officers encountered the same man again a few days later trespassing at Walmart after responding to a call for suspected theft of a watch. An officer demanded the man’s identification and tried to block him from leaving the store. One officer grabbed the man’s wrist, but the man tried to pull his arm away and push past the officer, causing the man to fall backward. The officer climbed on top of the man to control his movement and used his baton to try to pry the man’s hands from under his body. A second officer arrived, and they tried to handcuff the man, who, according to officers, clenched his fists and refused to put his hands behind his back. The second officer punched the side of the man’s body three times. The officer claimed he hit the man three times because he did not know if the man was armed, but did not articulate any basis for suspecting that he was. The officers arrested the man and charged him with trespassing and resisting or obstructing. This force was excessive. There were two officers present and the man was not threatening violence. It was disproportionate to punch the man three times to remove his hands from under his body.

In addition to the excessive force, these incidents indicate failings in JPD’s crisis intervention system. During each encounter with this man, it should have been apparent to officers that he had a behavioral health disability. Yet none of the officers used de-escalation techniques—like speaking to the man calmly, slowing down the encounter, attempting to address his needs, or calling in additional support. To the contrary, officers escalated each encounter and quickly resorted to force in response to behaviors consistent with someone experiencing a behavioral health crisis. In the first two instances, the officers did not have specialized CIT training, and they did not seek the assistance of CIT officers or mental health professionals. The third incident did involve CIT officers but, despite their training, these officers similarly failed to employ crisis intervention skills and techniques. We saw no evidence in our review that JPD conducted any follow up work to identify the man as someone in need of services, or that JPD reviewed these encounters to identify opportunities to improve practices going forward.

An old barn in Will County

Other examples raised similar concerns. In a 2020 incident, officers used excessive force while trying to forcibly detain a suicidal man so they could transport him to the hospital. His girlfriend had called 911 when the man texted that he was going to overdose. Although there was no crime alleged, no weapon involved, and the caller was seeking help with a mental health crisis, JPD’s Communications Center dispatched a JPD officer. When the officer entered the man’s apartment, he told the officer he had taken pills and wanted to die and that he would not leave without a fight. The officer called for backup. More officers and the fire department arrived. Multiple first responders tried to convince the man to come out of the corner of the room, and an officer approached the man and attempted to handcuff him. The man tried to punch the officer in the face, and the officer took him to the ground. The man continued to resist being handcuffed, and an officer punched him in the face three times. The repeated use of head strikes as a tactic for compliance was excessive given the man was unarmed, was already on the ground, and was experiencing a behavioral health crisis.

In addition to further illustrating JPD’s pattern or practice of unlawful force, this incident reveals the potentially damaging impact of using police officers to respond to psychiatric emergencies. Police officers are not mental health professionals. The average police officer, even one who has received some specialized training, is unlikely to be able to counsel a man who is experiencing suicidal ideation and convince him to seek treatment, particularly given that the mere presence of police officers can increase the distress of someone in crisis.^[18]

As we have noted, JPD is taking positive steps to improve its response to people in crisis. We also recognize that JPD on its own cannot create the full range of resources needed to best provide services to those experiencing behavioral health issues. But JPD is not doing all it can, and until it does, vulnerable people remain at heightened risk of harm.

Recommendations for Modifications to JPD’s Crisis Response System

JPD has made some recent strides in developing its crisis response tools, but developing a comprehensive crisis response system that effectively addresses the needs of people with behavioral health disabilities will require continued improvement and support. As one JPD officer pointed out, new Will County alternate response programs may be a great alternative to handling calls where non-criminal issues can be resolved without police.^[19] As the officer expressed, “If there’s an issue involved that’s not criminal, we don’t need to be there. Let’s get them the right help they need.” To address the concerns we have identified, JPD will need to both improve its internal CIT program and continue to deepen its partnerships with other entities to reduce Joliet’s reliance on police for behavioral health crises.

JPD should modify its CIT program to ensure officers effectively and safely resolve encounters involving people with behavioral health disabilities when a law enforcement response is necessary

As described above, we reviewed instances in which officers encountered someone they knew or should have known had a behavioral health disability and, rather than using crisis intervention techniques, resorted to force quickly and used force disproportionately. Improvements in JPD’s crisis intervention program can help JPD resolve these encounters more safely and effectively, and in a way that will help reduce repeated encounters to address the same unmet needs.^[20]

JPD’s crisis intervention program consists almost entirely of one component of the Crisis Intervention Team Model: training. JPD provides some officers—the Crisis Intervention Team Officers (CIT Officers)—with forty hours of training in crisis intervention skills. In addition, JPD recently has begun providing all probationary JPD officers with basic CIT training and all JPD officers now receive annual CIT training.^[21] This 8-hour CIT training provided to non-CIT Officers is designed to equip them with the ability to recognize when someone may have a behavioral health disability.^[22] This is consistent with the CIT model, but an effective CIT system is comprised of much more than training.^[23]

JPD must also ensure that it actually utilizes its specially trained officers at calls involving someone with a behavioral health disability. As a first step in the process, dispatchers must be given additional training to recognize these calls and the need to send a CIT-trained officer.^[24] JPD also needs to provide dispatchers a current list of CIT officers. JPD’s Communications Center call-takers currently have no such list, and while dispatchers may informally receive information about which officers have CIT training, they have no reliable means of knowing who is CIT-trained and can be dispatched to calls involving people with behavioral health disabilities. Instead, responses by CIT officers are ad-hoc: if a CIT officer hears a call with someone in crisis and happens to be available, they can respond to the call.

Ideally, JPD’s CIT officers should be led by a CIT coordinator who: uses data to determine appropriate staffing and distribute CIT officers across shifts to ensure they are available to respond to these calls;^[25] reviews police encounters involving people with behavioral health disabilities to improve outcomes; builds partnerships and coordinates with community service providers to improve services to individuals the team has encountered;^[26] and helps select officers to serve as CIT officers among applicants who have volunteered for the assignment.^[27]

Importantly, JPD may not have enough CIT officers to handle the volume of calls involving individuals with behavioral health disabilities. In the last five years, around 10% of JPD’s sworn officers have received the 40-hour crisis intervention training and were certified as CIT officers. As JPD comes to understand its needs in this area more fully, it may determine that more CIT officers are needed.

Currently, JPD does not consistently collect, maintain, or review data on interactions with individuals with behavioral health disabilities to assess outcomes or determine staffing needs. JPD should begin by collecting data on the number of calls received that involve an individual with a behavioral health disability across different shifts and districts, and the number of calls responded to by a CIT-trained officer. JPD should also collect and analyze data related to the outcomes of these calls, such as use of force, whether de-escalation and procedural justice techniques were used, arrest, and injury rates, and use of non-JPD resources (such as Will County’s 590 Crisis Care Program). JPD should then use that data to shape its training programs.^[28]

JPD also should revise its crisis intervention policies. JPD’s “Mental Health Subjects” policy fails to give officers meaningful guidance, contains inaccurate definitions, and includes outdated terms—such as “mentally retarded,” “mental retardation,” and “emotionally ill”—to describe individuals with behavioral health disabilities.^[29] JPD should work with local community organizations and individuals with lived experiences to revise its policies on interacting with individuals who have behavioral health disabilities.^[30]

JPD should continue to work with local agencies to develop programs that support deploying non-police professionals to calls that can be safely resolved without a law enforcement response

In some of the instances we reviewed in which officers used excessive force against an individual with a behavioral health disability, the presence or participation of police officers may have been both unnecessary and detrimental to efforts to effectively resolve the encounter. JPD should continue to work with Will County to develop and ensure the deployment of community-based, behavioral health service provider mobile crisis teams to behavioral health calls—instead of or in addition to (as appropriate) law enforcement.^[31] “Community-based crisis services play a key role in preventing needless institutionalization, law enforcement encounters, and incarceration of people with disabilities.”^[32] Robust alternative services will allow some calls involving behavioral health needs to be diverted from a law enforcement response and help ensure that encounters that do require a law enforcement response are more effectively and safely resolved.

Community members have called on the City and JPD to incorporate a team of mental health professionals and social workers as first responders in cases of suicide intervention, overdose, and other mental health and behavioral crises. In our conversations with community members, we also heard a need for more community-based resources to help individuals in crisis, especially individuals with repeat acute mental health episodes. And in applying for a grant to receive funding to improve its mental health services, the Department explicitly recognizes that Joliet “has struggled to provide a sufficient level of mental health resources for all of its community members.”

Encouragingly, Joliet is working to develop and implement an effective, non-law-enforcement response to calls and encounters involving someone in crisis. First, where appropriate, JPD’s Communications Center will refer 911 calls to the newly developed, federally mandated 988 Suicide and Crisis Intervention line administered by the Illinois Department of Human Services.^[33] Additionally, JPD recently shared its intention to coordinate with the Will County Health Department on its 590 Crisis Care Program, which is designed to link individuals to social services that can address their needs.^[34] JPD also sought and received a federal grant to develop and implement a program to help connect individuals who have behavioral health needs to community service providers. Funding from this grant has been used to increase training for officers and dispatchers and to provide case management services to individuals to address unmet needs.

The Department’s implementation of these programs is a significant step in expanding the array of services available to individuals with behavioral health disabilities. We commend JPD for taking these proactive steps to improve its response to people with behavioral health disabilities. If implemented effectively, this program may help address many of the deficiencies we identified in our investigation.

JPD also has the human talent to do this well. JPD officers developed an innovative program to support veterans experiencing a behavioral or mental health crisis. Under the “Battle Buddy Program,” JPD enlists the help of officers who are veterans of the armed services to respond to calls involving veterans “who may be despondent, suicidal, or in need of a referral for housing, transportation, substance abuse treatment, or mental health counseling.”^[35] In a 2021 incident, officers effectively used de-escalation techniques to resolve an encounter with a veteran who claimed to be armed and was threatening to kill officers and himself.

During our investigation, we reviewed other instances in which JPD officers used crisis intervention skills to resolve calls involving individuals who appeared to have behavioral health disabilities. These officers were patient, respectful, and skilled at using crisis intervention techniques to assist individuals who had behavioral health needs without resorting to unnecessary force. JPD should leverage the talent and commitment of these officers—and work to identify others—to help develop and implement modifications to its crisis intervention systems to better serve people in Joliet who have behavioral health disabilities.